This week, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a license for GE-Hitachi to build and operate a laser enrichment plant. While GE obviously considers this to be great progress -- or they wouldn't have applied for the license in the first place -- others disagree.
Laser enrichment has been a hot topic for potential proliferation risks since the 1970s when it was created. In July, Nature published an insightful article by Sharon Weinberger describing some of the concerns raised specifically by laser enrichment. The picture below from this article (click to make it bigger!) compares gaseous diffusion, gas centrifuge, and laser enrichment.
Photo Credit: "Laser plant offers cheap way to make nuclear fuel" - Nature, July 5, 2012, p. 16.
You can see how the Nature article ranks laser enrichment as significantly more risky for proliferation than the other technologies. This is a point argued by many experts in the nonproliferation field, however, it is one that the NRC and GE-Hitachi took under consideration. GE pursued an independent assessment of the risk, using three proliferation experts (Donald Kerr, Gordon Oehler, and Susan Koch). The conclusion of these experts was that the technology was safe to move forward with. At this point, the unclassified report isn't publicly available -- which is frustrating considering other experts who reviewed it believe there's no proprietary information included. It makes it considerably more difficult to discuss when all the information isn't available.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative included a quote from GE-Hitachi in their reporting, which implies that the proliferation-resistance is inherent to the secrecy of the technology.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative included a quote from GE-Hitachi in their reporting, which implies that the proliferation-resistance is inherent to the secrecy of the technology.
“The process itself is complex and virtually unknown. [Our] ability to succeed will be based on the application of critical experts, complex technologies and significant investment.”However, this essentially contradicts a power quote from Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, that concluded the Nature article.
“The most sensitive technology leak has already occurred. And it’s that this stuff can work.”How can we assume that simply because we have the technology now, others won't later? That type of thinking hasn't historically worked out very well. Which raises the question -- what responsibility do companies, and in turn countries, have to preventing the spread of technology which could be used for proliferation?
3 comments:
A nearly perfect post, Savannah. Love the set-up, the interest, the topic, the link to Khan. Perfect.
An apropos quote from J. Robert Oppenheimer:
"I have no remorse about the making of the bomb and Trinity [the first test of an a-bomb]. That was done right. As for how we used it, I understand why it happened and appreciate with what nobility those men with whom I'd worked made their decision. But I do not have the feeling that it was done right. The ultimatum to Japan [the Potsdam Proclamation demanding Japan's surrender] was full of pious platitudes. ...our government should have acted with more foresight and clarity in telling the world and Japan what the bomb meant." (Lansing Lamont, Day of Trinity, pg. 332-333).
Food for thought in an of itself, but to me it begs a question, perhaps in a similar manner as yours. Does how we introduce new technology have an effect on how it is viewed in the future?
These two questions are definitely integral to engineering and science ethics, but I don't believe there's a clear cut answer for either one.
When it comes to non-proliferation, it is clear, to me at least, that by perfecting enrichment techniques it is only further helping those that seek to stockpile materials. However, on the engineering and technology side, we want to see a turn-around on used nuclear fuel to make the nuclear fuel cycle more economically favorable.
If you use Oppenheimer's logic, it is not the technology or the discovery that is inherently wrong. It is the human that utilized it for ill will, and it is HOW it was used that is wrong. So in theory, the company bears no responsibility for how the technology is used.
This is obviously my opinion, but by placing blame on the company or the person/s who are responsible for creation is only going to serve to halt technological achievement. If we are afraid of what we discover, then there will be no progress.
@Jen - Thank you!
@Gwendolyn - You raise a very good point. As nuclear engineers who support the nuclear industry, a cheaper means of enriching fuel is a positive. From a nonproliferation standpoint though, it does raise some questions. Perhaps I should have framed my question more clearly. I don't think we should blame companies for streamlining processes that could possibly be used for "wrong". More specifically, what level of responsibility do they have to protect the technology from essentially corporate espionage? Or is it enough for proliferators to know the technology works, and they'll go from there? Thanks again for your thoughtful comments, I enjoy our dialogue!
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